Brazil does not need good controlling. It needs organized people, conscientious, that if it mobilizes to decide seusproblemas. of leaderships politics compromised to mudanas.' ' The scientist politician Sader Emir, in text in same revistaquestiona: ' ' He has who says that nothing of important if he decides in 2010. He would be omesmo that he had Alckmin or Lula in 2006? It will be the same the deepening or return equipetucano-demonic of the current government with Dilma? ' ' It is asociedade of the escapism. We live in a constant escape. It is as in an old drawing, of the lion of the fearful mountain. Whenever it appeared a danger, it ran away saying afrase ' ' strategical exit for the left right/! ' ' Still well that tenhoo Nietzsche to console me. In its wonderful one Thus Zaratustra Spoke, temuma interesting ticket: ' ' The public square is full of palhaossolenes and the people if vainglory of its great men.

They are for them senhoresdo moment. She oppresses them to the moment and they it you, in turn, oppress. They demand of tium yes or not. Unfortunate person! You want to place you enters one and one pro against? Noinvejes these intransigents, these demanding ones, you who you love the truth! Averdade never hung from the one arm intransigente.' ' I only know of a thing: most important is to botar the mouth nomundo, is to participate, to use to advantage the windows that if open to argue to econversar with the others. This quarrel that is happening, for example, on the human rights. Nobody can be of is! It is a thing that dizrespeito to all the citizens of this Country! We live in a Country where the people somortas inside of hospitals, in its proper houses, the encampments of the cantos MST nosquatro e, mainly in the penitentiaries.

Conflicts between moderate and radical officers permearam the 21 years of military government generating frequent instability politics. On the other hand, one was about a situation that kept in functioning the mechanisms and the procedures of a representative democracy: the Congress and the Judiciary one had continued in functioning, the spite to have its drastically reduced powers and of several of its members to be expurgados; it was remained alternation in the presidency of the Republic; they had remained the periodic elections, even so kept under controls of some natures; the political parties had drastically continued in functioning, although the partisan activity to be limited. In synthesis, it was an arrangement that combined characteristic traces of an authoritarian military regimen with other typical ones of a democratic system. This peculiar arrangement was the responsible one, in great measure, for successive crises politics that had folloied the regimen, having made it if to inside characterize for alternated phases of repression and liberalization permeadas by crises resultant politics of conflicts of the army and between these groups and the democratic opposition. The instability that folloied government of the military in Brazil, indicative of the difficulty of institutionalization of the regimen, characterizes the Brazilian authoritarianism as a situation instead of a regimen properly said. Regimen or situation, the fact is that the establishment of this arrangement hybrid politician had great impact in the way as if gave the Brazilian transistion. However, before analyzing the transistion process, another characteristic in the Brazilian model, of this time in the economic scope, it must be pointed. In contrast with what she happened, for example, in Chile, where the military government provoked a significant change in the economic model, in Brazil the military had not innovated in substance of economic policy.

With exception of the three first years of military government, when all the efforts had been concentrated in the stabilization program to contain the high taxes of inflation, the economic policy, during the military period, basically the same followed effective model since the government Vargas. The call ' ' miracle brasileiro' ' of period 1967-73 it had as sustentculo, on the other hand, the results gotten for the politics of stabilization of 1964-67 e, for another one, one development politics that consolidated and intensified the model of substitution of importation that reserved to the State still more important an enterprising paper. For 1974 return, the spite of the signals of that the miracle had if I insult manifest for the impact that the world-wide crisis of the oil exerted in Brazil, the same way continued to be trod. A ambitious person politics of substitution of importation of raw material and industrial goods, supported for investments of the public sector and foreign loans, was the followed strategy. Certainly, this strategy had success when guaranteeing high taxes of investment and when making of the Brazilian experience of military man-authoritarian regimen a case of well-succeeded economic performance. However, it was also responsible for serious disequilibria, and the economic problems that they had provoked military intervention in 1964 high inflation and economic stagnation had resurged still more with intensity, remaining as deep cloth of of the transistion process politics.